From fd091b04316db9dc5fafadbd6bdbe60b127408a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Mueller Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2020 08:32:06 -0800 Subject: Update nitrokey crate to 0.4.0 This change finally updates the version of the nitrokey crate that we consume to 0.4.0. Along with that we update rand_core, one of its dependencies, to 0.5.1. Further more we add cfg-if in version 0.1.10 and getrandom in version 0.1.13, both of which are now new (non-development) dependencies. Import subrepo nitrokey/:nitrokey at e81057037e9b4f370b64c0a030a725bc6bdfb870 Import subrepo cfg-if/:cfg-if at 4484a6faf816ff8058088ad857b0c6bb2f4b02b2 Import subrepo getrandom/:getrandom at d661aa7e1b8cc80b47dabe3d2135b3b47d2858af Import subrepo rand/:rand at d877ed528248b52d947e0484364a4e1ae59ca502 --- rand/rand_jitter/src/lib.rs | 750 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 750 insertions(+) create mode 100644 rand/rand_jitter/src/lib.rs (limited to 'rand/rand_jitter/src/lib.rs') diff --git a/rand/rand_jitter/src/lib.rs b/rand/rand_jitter/src/lib.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..49c53e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/rand/rand_jitter/src/lib.rs @@ -0,0 +1,750 @@ +// Copyright 2018 Developers of the Rand project. +// +// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 or the MIT license +// , at your +// option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed +// except according to those terms. +// +// Based on jitterentropy-library, http://www.chronox.de/jent.html. +// Copyright Stephan Mueller , 2014 - 2017. +// +// With permission from Stephan Mueller to relicense the Rust translation under +// the MIT license. + +//! Non-physical true random number generator based on timing jitter. +//! +//! Note that this RNG is not suited for use cases where cryptographic security is +//! required (also see this [discussion]). +//! +//! This is a true random number generator, as opposed to pseudo-random +//! generators. Random numbers generated by `JitterRng` can be seen as fresh +//! entropy. A consequence is that it is orders of magnitude slower than `OsRng` +//! and PRNGs (about 103..106 slower). +//! +//! There are very few situations where using this RNG is appropriate. Only very +//! few applications require true entropy. A normal PRNG can be statistically +//! indistinguishable, and a cryptographic PRNG should also be as impossible to +//! predict. +//! +//! `JitterRng` can be used without the standard library, but not conveniently, +//! you must provide a high-precision timer and carefully have to follow the +//! instructions of [`JitterRng::new_with_timer`]. +//! +//! This implementation is based on [Jitterentropy] version 2.1.0. +//! +//! Note: There is no accurate timer available on WASM platforms, to help +//! prevent fingerprinting or timing side-channel attacks. Therefore +//! [`JitterRng::new()`] is not available on WASM. It is also unavailable +//! with disabled `std` feature. +//! +//! [Jitterentropy]: http://www.chronox.de/jent.html +//! [discussion]: https://github.com/rust-random/rand/issues/699 + +#![doc(html_logo_url = "https://www.rust-lang.org/logos/rust-logo-128x128-blk.png", + html_favicon_url = "https://www.rust-lang.org/favicon.ico", + html_root_url = "https://rust-random.github.io/rand/")] + +#![deny(missing_docs)] +#![deny(missing_debug_implementations)] +#![doc(test(attr(allow(unused_variables), deny(warnings))))] + +// Note: the C implementation of `Jitterentropy` relies on being compiled +// without optimizations. This implementation goes through lengths to make the +// compiler not optimize out code which does influence timing jitter, but is +// technically dead code. +#![no_std] +#[cfg(feature = "std")] +extern crate std; + +pub use rand_core; + +// Coming from https://crates.io/crates/doc-comment +#[cfg(test)] +macro_rules! doc_comment { + ($x:expr) => { + #[doc = $x] + extern {} + }; +} + +#[cfg(test)] +doc_comment!(include_str!("../README.md")); + +#[allow(unused)] +macro_rules! trace { ($($x:tt)*) => ( + #[cfg(feature = "log")] { + log::trace!($($x)*) + } +) } +#[allow(unused)] +macro_rules! debug { ($($x:tt)*) => ( + #[cfg(feature = "log")] { + log::debug!($($x)*) + } +) } +#[allow(unused)] +macro_rules! info { ($($x:tt)*) => ( + #[cfg(feature = "log")] { + log::info!($($x)*) + } +) } +#[allow(unused)] +macro_rules! warn { ($($x:tt)*) => ( + #[cfg(feature = "log")] { + log::warn!($($x)*) + } +) } +#[allow(unused)] +macro_rules! error { ($($x:tt)*) => ( + #[cfg(feature = "log")] { + log::error!($($x)*) + } +) } + +#[cfg(feature = "std")] +mod platform; +mod error; + +use rand_core::{RngCore, Error, impls}; +pub use crate::error::TimerError; + +use core::{fmt, mem, ptr}; +#[cfg(feature = "std")] +use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering}; + +const MEMORY_BLOCKS: usize = 64; +const MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE: usize = 32; +const MEMORY_SIZE: usize = MEMORY_BLOCKS * MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE; + +/// A true random number generator based on jitter in the CPU execution time, +/// and jitter in memory access time. +/// +/// Note that this RNG is not suitable for use cases where cryptographic +/// security is required. +pub struct JitterRng { + data: u64, // Actual random number + // Number of rounds to run the entropy collector per 64 bits + rounds: u8, + // Timer used by `measure_jitter` + timer: fn() -> u64, + // Memory for the Memory Access noise source + mem_prev_index: u16, + // Make `next_u32` not waste 32 bits + data_half_used: bool, +} + +// Note: `JitterRng` maintains a small 64-bit entropy pool. With every +// `generate` 64 new bits should be integrated in the pool. If a round of +// `generate` were to collect less than the expected 64 bit, then the returned +// value, and the new state of the entropy pool, would be in some way related to +// the initial state. It is therefore better if the initial state of the entropy +// pool is different on each call to `generate`. This has a few implications: +// - `generate` should be called once before using `JitterRng` to produce the +// first usable value (this is done by default in `new`); +// - We do not zero the entropy pool after generating a result. The reference +// implementation also does not support zeroing, but recommends generating a +// new value without using it if you want to protect a previously generated +// 'secret' value from someone inspecting the memory; +// - Implementing `Clone` seems acceptable, as it would not cause the systematic +// bias a constant might cause. Only instead of one value that could be +// potentially related to the same initial state, there are now two. + +// Entropy collector state. +// These values are not necessary to preserve across runs. +struct EcState { + // Previous time stamp to determine the timer delta + prev_time: u64, + // Deltas used for the stuck test + last_delta: i32, + last_delta2: i32, + // Memory for the Memory Access noise source + mem: [u8; MEMORY_SIZE], +} + +impl EcState { + // Stuck test by checking the: + // - 1st derivation of the jitter measurement (time delta) + // - 2nd derivation of the jitter measurement (delta of time deltas) + // - 3rd derivation of the jitter measurement (delta of delta of time + // deltas) + // + // All values must always be non-zero. + // This test is a heuristic to see whether the last measurement holds + // entropy. + fn stuck(&mut self, current_delta: i32) -> bool { + let delta2 = self.last_delta - current_delta; + let delta3 = delta2 - self.last_delta2; + + self.last_delta = current_delta; + self.last_delta2 = delta2; + + current_delta == 0 || delta2 == 0 || delta3 == 0 + } +} + +// Custom Debug implementation that does not expose the internal state +impl fmt::Debug for JitterRng { + fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result { + write!(f, "JitterRng {{}}") + } +} + +impl Clone for JitterRng { + fn clone(&self) -> JitterRng { + JitterRng { + data: self.data, + rounds: self.rounds, + timer: self.timer, + mem_prev_index: self.mem_prev_index, + // The 32 bits that may still be unused from the previous round are + // for the original to use, not for the clone. + data_half_used: false, + } + } +} + +// Initialise to zero; must be positive +#[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(target_arch = "wasm32")))] +static JITTER_ROUNDS: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0); + +impl JitterRng { + /// Create a new `JitterRng`. Makes use of `std::time` for a timer, or a + /// platform-specific function with higher accuracy if necessary and + /// available. + /// + /// During initialization CPU execution timing jitter is measured a few + /// hundred times. If this does not pass basic quality tests, an error is + /// returned. The test result is cached to make subsequent calls faster. + #[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(target_arch = "wasm32")))] + pub fn new() -> Result { + if cfg!(target_arch = "wasm32") { + return Err(TimerError::NoTimer); + } + let mut state = JitterRng::new_with_timer(platform::get_nstime); + let mut rounds = JITTER_ROUNDS.load(Ordering::Relaxed) as u8; + if rounds == 0 { + // No result yet: run test. + // This allows the timer test to run multiple times; we don't care. + rounds = state.test_timer()?; + JITTER_ROUNDS.store(rounds as usize, Ordering::Relaxed); + info!("JitterRng: using {} rounds per u64 output", rounds); + } + state.set_rounds(rounds); + + // Fill `data` with a non-zero value. + state.gen_entropy(); + Ok(state) + } + + /// Create a new `JitterRng`. + /// A custom timer can be supplied, making it possible to use `JitterRng` in + /// `no_std` environments. + /// + /// The timer must have nanosecond precision. + /// + /// This method is more low-level than `new()`. It is the responsibility of + /// the caller to run [`test_timer`] before using any numbers generated with + /// `JitterRng`, and optionally call [`set_rounds`]. Also it is important to + /// consume at least one `u64` before using the first result to initialize + /// the entropy collection pool. + /// + /// # Example + /// + /// ``` + /// # use rand_jitter::rand_core::{RngCore, Error}; + /// use rand_jitter::JitterRng; + /// + /// # fn try_inner() -> Result<(), Error> { + /// fn get_nstime() -> u64 { + /// use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH}; + /// + /// let dur = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).unwrap(); + /// // The correct way to calculate the current time is + /// // `dur.as_secs() * 1_000_000_000 + dur.subsec_nanos() as u64` + /// // But this is faster, and the difference in terms of entropy is + /// // negligible (log2(10^9) == 29.9). + /// dur.as_secs() << 30 | dur.subsec_nanos() as u64 + /// } + /// + /// let mut rng = JitterRng::new_with_timer(get_nstime); + /// let rounds = rng.test_timer()?; + /// rng.set_rounds(rounds); // optional + /// let _ = rng.next_u64(); + /// + /// // Ready for use + /// let v: u64 = rng.next_u64(); + /// # Ok(()) + /// # } + /// + /// # let _ = try_inner(); + /// ``` + /// + /// [`test_timer`]: JitterRng::test_timer + /// [`set_rounds`]: JitterRng::set_rounds + pub fn new_with_timer(timer: fn() -> u64) -> JitterRng { + JitterRng { + data: 0, + rounds: 64, + timer, + mem_prev_index: 0, + data_half_used: false, + } + } + + /// Configures how many rounds are used to generate each 64-bit value. + /// This must be greater than zero, and has a big impact on performance + /// and output quality. + /// + /// [`new_with_timer`] conservatively uses 64 rounds, but often less rounds + /// can be used. The `test_timer()` function returns the minimum number of + /// rounds required for full strength (platform dependent), so one may use + /// `rng.set_rounds(rng.test_timer()?);` or cache the value. + /// + /// [`new_with_timer`]: JitterRng::new_with_timer + pub fn set_rounds(&mut self, rounds: u8) { + assert!(rounds > 0); + self.rounds = rounds; + } + + // Calculate a random loop count used for the next round of an entropy + // collection, based on bits from a fresh value from the timer. + // + // The timer is folded to produce a number that contains at most `n_bits` + // bits. + // + // Note: A constant should be added to the resulting random loop count to + // prevent loops that run 0 times. + #[inline(never)] + fn random_loop_cnt(&mut self, n_bits: u32) -> u32 { + let mut rounds = 0; + + let mut time = (self.timer)(); + // Mix with the current state of the random number balance the random + // loop counter a bit more. + time ^= self.data; + + // We fold the time value as much as possible to ensure that as many + // bits of the time stamp are included as possible. + let folds = (64 + n_bits - 1) / n_bits; + let mask = (1 << n_bits) - 1; + for _ in 0..folds { + rounds ^= time & mask; + time >>= n_bits; + } + + rounds as u32 + } + + // CPU jitter noise source + // Noise source based on the CPU execution time jitter + // + // This function injects the individual bits of the time value into the + // entropy pool using an LFSR. + // + // The code is deliberately inefficient with respect to the bit shifting. + // This function not only acts as folding operation, but this function's + // execution is used to measure the CPU execution time jitter. Any change to + // the loop in this function implies that careful retesting must be done. + #[inline(never)] + fn lfsr_time(&mut self, time: u64, var_rounds: bool) { + fn lfsr(mut data: u64, time: u64) -> u64{ + for i in 1..65 { + let mut tmp = time << (64 - i); + tmp >>= 64 - 1; + + // Fibonacci LSFR with polynomial of + // x^64 + x^61 + x^56 + x^31 + x^28 + x^23 + 1 which is + // primitive according to + // http://poincare.matf.bg.ac.rs/~ezivkovm/publications/primpol1.pdf + // (the shift values are the polynomial values minus one + // due to counting bits from 0 to 63). As the current + // position is always the LSB, the polynomial only needs + // to shift data in from the left without wrap. + data ^= tmp; + data ^= (data >> 63) & 1; + data ^= (data >> 60) & 1; + data ^= (data >> 55) & 1; + data ^= (data >> 30) & 1; + data ^= (data >> 27) & 1; + data ^= (data >> 22) & 1; + data = data.rotate_left(1); + } + data + } + + // Note: in the reference implementation only the last round effects + // `self.data`, all the other results are ignored. To make sure the + // other rounds are not optimised out, we first run all but the last + // round on a throw-away value instead of the real `self.data`. + let mut lfsr_loop_cnt = 0; + if var_rounds { lfsr_loop_cnt = self.random_loop_cnt(4) }; + + let mut throw_away: u64 = 0; + for _ in 0..lfsr_loop_cnt { + throw_away = lfsr(throw_away, time); + } + black_box(throw_away); + + self.data = lfsr(self.data, time); + } + + // Memory Access noise source + // This is a noise source based on variations in memory access times + // + // This function performs memory accesses which will add to the timing + // variations due to an unknown amount of CPU wait states that need to be + // added when accessing memory. The memory size should be larger than the L1 + // caches as outlined in the documentation and the associated testing. + // + // The L1 cache has a very high bandwidth, albeit its access rate is usually + // slower than accessing CPU registers. Therefore, L1 accesses only add + // minimal variations as the CPU has hardly to wait. Starting with L2, + // significant variations are added because L2 typically does not belong to + // the CPU any more and therefore a wider range of CPU wait states is + // necessary for accesses. L3 and real memory accesses have even a wider + // range of wait states. However, to reliably access either L3 or memory, + // the `self.mem` memory must be quite large which is usually not desirable. + #[inline(never)] + fn memaccess(&mut self, mem: &mut [u8; MEMORY_SIZE], var_rounds: bool) { + let mut acc_loop_cnt = 128; + if var_rounds { acc_loop_cnt += self.random_loop_cnt(4) }; + + let mut index = self.mem_prev_index as usize; + for _ in 0..acc_loop_cnt { + // Addition of memblocksize - 1 to index with wrap around logic to + // ensure that every memory location is hit evenly. + // The modulus also allows the compiler to remove the indexing + // bounds check. + index = (index + MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE - 1) % MEMORY_SIZE; + + // memory access: just add 1 to one byte + // memory access implies read from and write to memory location + mem[index] = mem[index].wrapping_add(1); + } + self.mem_prev_index = index as u16; + } + + // This is the heart of the entropy generation: calculate time deltas and + // use the CPU jitter in the time deltas. The jitter is injected into the + // entropy pool. + // + // Ensure that `ec.prev_time` is primed before using the output of this + // function. This can be done by calling this function and not using its + // result. + fn measure_jitter(&mut self, ec: &mut EcState) -> Option<()> { + // Invoke one noise source before time measurement to add variations + self.memaccess(&mut ec.mem, true); + + // Get time stamp and calculate time delta to previous + // invocation to measure the timing variations + let time = (self.timer)(); + // Note: wrapping_sub combined with a cast to `i64` generates a correct + // delta, even in the unlikely case this is a timer that is not strictly + // monotonic. + let current_delta = time.wrapping_sub(ec.prev_time) as i64 as i32; + ec.prev_time = time; + + // Call the next noise source which also injects the data + self.lfsr_time(current_delta as u64, true); + + // Check whether we have a stuck measurement (i.e. does the last + // measurement holds entropy?). + if ec.stuck(current_delta) { return None }; + + // Rotate the data buffer by a prime number (any odd number would + // do) to ensure that every bit position of the input time stamp + // has an even chance of being merged with a bit position in the + // entropy pool. We do not use one here as the adjacent bits in + // successive time deltas may have some form of dependency. The + // chosen value of 7 implies that the low 7 bits of the next + // time delta value is concatenated with the current time delta. + self.data = self.data.rotate_left(7); + + Some(()) + } + + // Shuffle the pool a bit by mixing some value with a bijective function + // (XOR) into the pool. + // + // The function generates a mixer value that depends on the bits set and + // the location of the set bits in the random number generated by the + // entropy source. Therefore, based on the generated random number, this + // mixer value can have 2^64 different values. That mixer value is + // initialized with the first two SHA-1 constants. After obtaining the + // mixer value, it is XORed into the random number. + // + // The mixer value is not assumed to contain any entropy. But due to the + // XOR operation, it can also not destroy any entropy present in the + // entropy pool. + #[inline(never)] + fn stir_pool(&mut self) { + // This constant is derived from the first two 32 bit initialization + // vectors of SHA-1 as defined in FIPS 180-4 section 5.3.1 + // The order does not really matter as we do not rely on the specific + // numbers. We just pick the SHA-1 constants as they have a good mix of + // bit set and unset. + const CONSTANT: u64 = 0x67452301efcdab89; + + // The start value of the mixer variable is derived from the third + // and fourth 32 bit initialization vector of SHA-1 as defined in + // FIPS 180-4 section 5.3.1 + let mut mixer = 0x98badcfe10325476; + + // This is a constant time function to prevent leaking timing + // information about the random number. + // The normal code is: + // ``` + // for i in 0..64 { + // if ((self.data >> i) & 1) == 1 { mixer ^= CONSTANT; } + // } + // ``` + // This is a bit fragile, as LLVM really wants to use branches here, and + // we rely on it to not recognise the opportunity. + for i in 0..64 { + let apply = (self.data >> i) & 1; + let mask = !apply.wrapping_sub(1); + mixer ^= CONSTANT & mask; + mixer = mixer.rotate_left(1); + } + + self.data ^= mixer; + } + + fn gen_entropy(&mut self) -> u64 { + trace!("JitterRng: collecting entropy"); + + // Prime `ec.prev_time`, and run the noice sources to make sure the + // first loop round collects the expected entropy. + let mut ec = EcState { + prev_time: (self.timer)(), + last_delta: 0, + last_delta2: 0, + mem: [0; MEMORY_SIZE], + }; + let _ = self.measure_jitter(&mut ec); + + for _ in 0..self.rounds { + // If a stuck measurement is received, repeat measurement + // Note: we do not guard against an infinite loop, that would mean + // the timer suddenly became broken. + while self.measure_jitter(&mut ec).is_none() {} + } + + // Do a single read from `self.mem` to make sure the Memory Access noise + // source is not optimised out. + black_box(ec.mem[0]); + + self.stir_pool(); + self.data + } + + /// Basic quality tests on the timer, by measuring CPU timing jitter a few + /// hundred times. + /// + /// If successful, this will return the estimated number of rounds necessary + /// to collect 64 bits of entropy. Otherwise a [`TimerError`] with the cause + /// of the failure will be returned. + pub fn test_timer(&mut self) -> Result { + debug!("JitterRng: testing timer ..."); + // We could add a check for system capabilities such as `clock_getres` + // or check for `CONFIG_X86_TSC`, but it does not make much sense as the + // following sanity checks verify that we have a high-resolution timer. + + let mut delta_sum = 0; + let mut old_delta = 0; + + let mut time_backwards = 0; + let mut count_mod = 0; + let mut count_stuck = 0; + + let mut ec = EcState { + prev_time: (self.timer)(), + last_delta: 0, + last_delta2: 0, + mem: [0; MEMORY_SIZE], + }; + + // TESTLOOPCOUNT needs some loops to identify edge systems. + // 100 is definitely too little. + const TESTLOOPCOUNT: u64 = 300; + const CLEARCACHE: u64 = 100; + + for i in 0..(CLEARCACHE + TESTLOOPCOUNT) { + // Measure time delta of core entropy collection logic + let time = (self.timer)(); + self.memaccess(&mut ec.mem, true); + self.lfsr_time(time, true); + let time2 = (self.timer)(); + + // Test whether timer works + if time == 0 || time2 == 0 { + return Err(TimerError::NoTimer); + } + let delta = time2.wrapping_sub(time) as i64 as i32; + + // Test whether timer is fine grained enough to provide delta even + // when called shortly after each other -- this implies that we also + // have a high resolution timer + if delta == 0 { + return Err(TimerError::CoarseTimer); + } + + // Up to here we did not modify any variable that will be + // evaluated later, but we already performed some work. Thus we + // already have had an impact on the caches, branch prediction, + // etc. with the goal to clear it to get the worst case + // measurements. + if i < CLEARCACHE { continue; } + + if ec.stuck(delta) { count_stuck += 1; } + + // Test whether we have an increasing timer. + if !(time2 > time) { time_backwards += 1; } + + // Count the number of times the counter increases in steps of 100ns + // or greater. + if (delta % 100) == 0 { count_mod += 1; } + + // Ensure that we have a varying delta timer which is necessary for + // the calculation of entropy -- perform this check only after the + // first loop is executed as we need to prime the old_delta value + delta_sum += (delta - old_delta).abs() as u64; + old_delta = delta; + } + + // Do a single read from `self.mem` to make sure the Memory Access noise + // source is not optimised out. + black_box(ec.mem[0]); + + // We allow the time to run backwards for up to three times. + // This can happen if the clock is being adjusted by NTP operations. + // If such an operation just happens to interfere with our test, it + // should not fail. The value of 3 should cover the NTP case being + // performed during our test run. + if time_backwards > 3 { + return Err(TimerError::NotMonotonic); + } + + // Test that the available amount of entropy per round does not get to + // low. We expect 1 bit of entropy per round as a reasonable minimum + // (although less is possible, it means the collector loop has to run + // much more often). + // `assert!(delta_average >= log2(1))` + // `assert!(delta_sum / TESTLOOPCOUNT >= 1)` + // `assert!(delta_sum >= TESTLOOPCOUNT)` + if delta_sum < TESTLOOPCOUNT { + return Err(TimerError::TinyVariantions); + } + + // Ensure that we have variations in the time stamp below 100 for at + // least 10% of all checks -- on some platforms, the counter increments + // in multiples of 100, but not always + if count_mod > (TESTLOOPCOUNT * 9 / 10) { + return Err(TimerError::CoarseTimer); + } + + // If we have more than 90% stuck results, then this Jitter RNG is + // likely to not work well. + if count_stuck > (TESTLOOPCOUNT * 9 / 10) { + return Err(TimerError::TooManyStuck); + } + + // Estimate the number of `measure_jitter` rounds necessary for 64 bits + // of entropy. + // + // We don't try very hard to come up with a good estimate of the + // available bits of entropy per round here for two reasons: + // 1. Simple estimates of the available bits (like Shannon entropy) are + // too optimistic. + // 2. Unless we want to waste a lot of time during intialization, there + // only a small number of samples are available. + // + // Therefore we use a very simple and conservative estimate: + // `let bits_of_entropy = log2(delta_average) / 2`. + // + // The number of rounds `measure_jitter` should run to collect 64 bits + // of entropy is `64 / bits_of_entropy`. + let delta_average = delta_sum / TESTLOOPCOUNT; + + if delta_average >= 16 { + let log2 = 64 - delta_average.leading_zeros(); + // Do something similar to roundup(64/(log2/2)): + Ok( ((64u32 * 2 + log2 - 1) / log2) as u8) + } else { + // For values < 16 the rounding error becomes too large, use a + // lookup table. + // Values 0 and 1 are invalid, and filtered out by the + // `delta_sum < TESTLOOPCOUNT` test above. + let log2_lookup = [0, 0, 128, 81, 64, 56, 50, 46, + 43, 41, 39, 38, 36, 35, 34, 33]; + Ok(log2_lookup[delta_average as usize]) + } + } + + /// Statistical test: return the timer delta of one normal run of the + /// `JitterRng` entropy collector. + /// + /// Setting `var_rounds` to `true` will execute the memory access and the + /// CPU jitter noice sources a variable amount of times (just like a real + /// `JitterRng` round). + /// + /// Setting `var_rounds` to `false` will execute the noice sources the + /// minimal number of times. This can be used to measure the minimum amount + /// of entropy one round of the entropy collector can collect in the worst + /// case. + /// + /// See this crate's README on how to use `timer_stats` to test the quality + /// of `JitterRng`. + pub fn timer_stats(&mut self, var_rounds: bool) -> i64 { + let mut mem = [0; MEMORY_SIZE]; + + let time = (self.timer)(); + self.memaccess(&mut mem, var_rounds); + self.lfsr_time(time, var_rounds); + let time2 = (self.timer)(); + time2.wrapping_sub(time) as i64 + } +} + +// A function that is opaque to the optimizer to assist in avoiding dead-code +// elimination. Taken from `bencher`. +fn black_box(dummy: T) -> T { + unsafe { + let ret = ptr::read_volatile(&dummy); + mem::forget(dummy); + ret + } +} + +impl RngCore for JitterRng { + fn next_u32(&mut self) -> u32 { + // We want to use both parts of the generated entropy + if self.data_half_used { + self.data_half_used = false; + (self.data >> 32) as u32 + } else { + self.data = self.next_u64(); + self.data_half_used = true; + self.data as u32 + } + } + + fn next_u64(&mut self) -> u64 { + self.data_half_used = false; + self.gen_entropy() + } + + fn fill_bytes(&mut self, dest: &mut [u8]) { + // Fill using `next_u32`. This is faster for filling small slices (four + // bytes or less), while the overhead is negligible. + // + // This is done especially for wrappers that implement `next_u32` + // themselves via `fill_bytes`. + impls::fill_bytes_via_next(self, dest) + } + + fn try_fill_bytes(&mut self, dest: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), Error> { + Ok(self.fill_bytes(dest)) + } +} -- cgit v1.2.1